use that information to decide and act faster than Abstract -To implement the capabilities conceptualized opents." i1].
capabilities. The success of the initial NCW systems The National Military Strategy of the United States is deployed since Desert Storm, as limited as they were, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff s guiding revealed the potential battlespace domination offered document for defining the anticipated warfighting through networked systems providing situational and environments and capabilities needed to ensure the US information superiority.
One major challenge in maintains dominance during conflict. It states:
constructing effective NCW systems is designing the network to seamlessly integrate existing, planned and The joint force will use superior intelligence and the future platforms and systems into a secure, fully power of information technologies to increase interoperable, near real-time information system. The decision superiority, precision and lethality of the network will need to accommodate complex systems it may force. A networked force capable of decision or may not have been designed to interoperate. The superiority can collect, analyze and rapidly networked systems themselves are extremely complex and disseminate intelligence and orhter relevant will have been developed decades apart. The network information from the national to tactical levels, then design must be open, flexible and able to adapt to this wide DoD acquisition professionals must recognize that the disparity of system-of-systems.
warfighter capabilities needed require software development techniques that differ significantly when It is well understood that an Open-systems compared to their commercially based counterparts. The Architecture (OA) design is required to meet both current software engineering techniques used in short-lived and future warfighting needs and is a critical element in software products may not prove effective in developing net-centric warfare systems-of-systems concepts. These long-lived DoD software-intensive, warfighting systems. highly integrated systems are increasingly dependent on The need for OA design upgradeable, flexible, and highly software solutions for integration into the net-centric reliable software that is maintainable over a long life scheme; therefore, software interfaces are one of the main span is paramount to DoD's warfighting systems, but keys for achieving the tactical and strategic synergies of the industry-standard software engineering techniques do not net-centric system. This paper will focus on the challenges necessarily incorporate those features. presented when the Department of Defense (DoD) conducts capabilities analysis and derives performance What this means to the DoD is that the capabilities specifications for a software-intensive, net-centric, system-analysis and resulting system performance specifications of-systems architecture that meets OA needs throughout must be completed in significantly more detail to achieve the life of the system. software performance that meets warfighters' needs. The software developer needs to be driven to OA design by the The DoD Performance Specification development performance specifications because software engineering process transforms the warfighter requirements into terms discipline and state of the practice are unlikely to provide that are more understandable for the system developer, sufficient architectural designs without clearly usually the prime contractor. Typically, the system communicating explicit performance requirements. The performance requirements are decomposed through at least detailed performance specifications provide the software three levels using the Work Breakdown Structure (WBS) developer much more information about areas that the methodology. The number of WBS levels developed by customer the DoD sees as critical to overall system the DoD is dependent on the complexity of the system and performance. Such details will have a significant impact the engineering domain maturity.
on the system software design supporting OA performance and will provide the basis for a much more accurate cost Software engineering is not mature, and there are few and schedule estimate in the proposal received.
industry-wide standards for languages, tools, architectures, reuse, or procedures. Software developed for complex 2 Near-term Challenges weapon systems is typically started from scratch with each new system; very little existing software code is reused. In
The net-centric warfare concepts feature system-ofaddition, new languages and associated tools are systems in an elaborate network requiring a significant introduced every few years. For this and other reasons, number of critical interfaces. As each system is added or software programs grow exponentially in size and later upgrades its capabilities, it likely drives an interface complexity, expanding desired capabilities but limiting the change with other interfaced systems, necessitating the maturation process. The DoD Materiel Developer must need for flexibility in accommodating interface changes recognize the relative immaturity of software engineering from affected interoperating or networked systems. It is when developing the WBS for software-intensive systems easy to visualize dozens of software changes driven by and, more importantly, compensate for that immaturity.
upgrades in the interfaced components of the network and the critical need for effective OA designs to quickly and
The current state of software engineering maturity economically accommodate change over a long life span.
drastically impacts an area of extreme DoD concern Again, this level of design flexibility is not a software Supportability.
Hardware-centric performance industry norm for most commercially designed systems. specifications rely heavily on mature engineering environments to account for a significant portion of the Safety and Security requirements for DoD weapon system's supportability performance. There are literally system software have few commercial counterparts.
hundreds of ways to build the architecture and construct Obviously, commercially based critical medical equipment, the code for even the most basic software function. aviation systems, and banking systems would also require a Without physical or established engineering techniques, the high degree of safety and security, but the combat software developer is bounded only by his or her environment weapon systems are intended to operate imagination and creativity in satisfying broad within, and the military lives that are always at stake adds specifications. The resulting software may function to criticality of the DoD's particular need. The net-centric correctly, but may not possess the OA design needed to warfare environment will necessarily require effectively maintain, upgrade, or interface it with the unprecedented security measures. Software must be constantly changing net-centric systems and environment, designed to continue to operate critical weapon systems in degraded modes, reject spurious input without freezing or leaves the software developer estimating these failing, and resist intrusion, viruses and other attacks. requirements without the background or experience to do Anything short of that will put military members and the so, or worse yet, discovering the extent of the actual critical missions they perform at risk. Most commercially requirements after the work has begun. based software engineering disciplines do not consider such stringent safety and security requirements. The
The capabilities analysis process must capture the OA system's OA design must allow for the flexibility needed performance needed for supporting the system throughout while simultaneously ensuring safety and security its lifecycle. This analysis should drive a robust Post requirements. These two forces are rarely in concert and Production Software Support (PPSS) plan addressing the usually are in conflict.
MUIRSS elements of the OA design. The MUIRSS elements are interdependent and tend to apply across the Considering the state of immature software system and software architecture. Each MUIRSS element engineering that exists today, it is clear that the DoD will is discussed in the following paragraphs to provide a basis not achieve the level of software-intensive system for analyzing capability requirements within the area and performance necessary if the WBS and performance for capturing performance characteristics that are essential specification are not developed more fully before hand-off to the DoD. to the developer or contractor. Due to the pressure to shorten the acquisition timeline, there is a tendency to rush 4 Maintainability the Request for Proposal (RFP) to the prospective contractors without developing the WBS below level three
The amount of elapsed time between initial fielding or including the performance specification with sufficient and the first required software maintenance action can detail. The most diligent contractor can only provide cost probably be measured in hours, not days. The and schedule estimates based on what is presented in the effectiveness and efficiency of these required maintenance RFP. If a significant portion of the software development actions is dependent on several factors, but the software effort is not evident in the RFP, the contractor estimates architecture that was developed from the performance may be grossly understated, causing substantial and specifications provided is critical. The DoD must influence avoidable funding shortfalls and schedule overruns that the software architecture through the performance plague the development effort throughout the acquisition specification process to minimize the cost and time phase and well into the system's lifecycle. required to perform essential maintenance tasks. hardware-centric systems with mature engineering environments need not be. In addition to the system's Because the frequency of required software software performance issues, the OA areas of maintenance actions is going to be much higher than in Maitwainabliy Up grmadea is , the OAen rerabii other systems, the cost to perform these tasks is likely to be Reinability,Safey ad Secity, (MUInrSS must *abey1 higher as well. One of the reasons for this is that software Reliability, Safety, andaScurit (MUISS)mst be is no m aitandst setanrs .sae ot adwr carefully analyzed to ensure that the potential contractors is not maintained by "maintainers," as are most hardware understand the Government requirements and constraints in systems, but is maintained by the same type of people that each of these areas.
originally developed it software engineers. These engineers will be needed immediately upon fielding, and a
The Systems Engineering Process (SEP) is the number will be needed throughout the lifespan of the preferred technique for analysis within each of the system to perform maintenance, add capabilities, and MUIRSS categories as it provides a highly structured and upgrade the system. As the DoD has a very limited comprehensive methodology for developing the WBS. capability for supporting software internally, typically, Recognizing the existing shortfalls in software engineering early software support is provided by the original mtrity thi mehdlg wil greal asis th sotwre developer and is included in the RFP and proposal for developer in understanding OA-related performance inclusion into the contract or as a follow-on Contractor requirements; this, in turn, will significantly influence the Logistics Support (CLS) contract. software architecture design and the level of effort estimated to build the desired system. The alternative 5 Upgradeability
One method being employed by the DoD attempts to control the critical interfaces through a set of parameters or A net-centric environment composed of numerous protocols rather than through active management of the systems developed in an evolutionary acquisition model network and network environment. This method falls short will create an environment of almost continuous change as of success on several levels. It fails to understand and each system upgrades its capabilities over time. System control the effects of aggregating all of the systems in a software will have to accommodate the changes and will net-centric scheme. For instance, each individual system have to, in turn, be upgraded to leverage the consistently may meet all protocols for bandwidth, but when all systems added capabilities.
are engaged on the network, all bandwidth requirements are aggregated on the network overloading the total Trying to anticipate upgrade requirements for long-bandwidth available for all systems [3] . Understanding lived systems is extremely challenging to Materiel and controlling the interfaces is critical for effective Developers, but is well worth their effort. Unanticipated interoperation at both the system and system-of-systems software changes in the operational support phase cost 50 level. The individual program manager must actively to 200 times the cost in early design. Any software manage all systems' interfaces impacting OA performance, designed to accommodate an upgrade that is never realized and a network PM must do the same for the critical costs virtually nothing compared to such an exponential network interfaces. Due to this necessity of constant expense.
management, a parameters and protocols approach to netcentric OA performance is unlikely to produce the 6 Interfaces/Interoperability capabilities and functionality expected by the warfighter.
OA design focuses on the strict control of interfaces Understanding the software interfaces begins with the to ensure the maximum flexibility in adding or changing software architecture; controlling the interfaces is a unique system modules, whether they are hardware or software in challenge encompassing both the need to integrate legacy nature. This presupposes that the system modules are and dissimilar systems as well as the lack of software known which seems logical, as most hardware modules interface standards within the existing software engineering are well defined and bounded by both physics and mature environment. As stated earlier, the architecture needs to be engineering standards. In sharp contrast to hardware, driven through detailed performance specifications, which software modularity is not bounded by physics, and there will help define the interfaces to be controlled. An are very few software industry standards for the modular effective method for controlling the interfaces is to architecture in software components. This is yet another intensely manage a well-defined Interface Control area in which the software developer needs much more Document (ICD), which should be a Contract Data information about operational, maintenance, reliability, Requirements List (CDRL) deliverable on any softwaresafety and security performance requirements, as well as intensive or networked system. current, planned and potential system upgrades. These requirements, once well-defined and clearly 7 Reliability communicated, will drive the developer to design a software modular architecture supporting OA performance
While the need for highly reliable weapon systems is goals.
obvious, the impact on total system reliability of integrating complex software components is not so With the system software modular architecture obvious. Typically, as system complexity increases, developed, the focus returns to the interfaces between maintaining system reliability becomes more of a hardware and software modules, as well as to the external challenge. Add the complexity of effectively networking a interfaces needed for the desired interoperability of the net-system-of-systems (all of which are individually complex) centric force. Software is, of course, one of the essential to a critical warfighting capability that is constantly enablers for interoperability and provides a powerful tool evolving over time, and reliability becomes daunting. for interfacing systems including systems that were not designed to work together. Software performing the Once again, the software developer must have an function of "middleware" allows legacy and other understanding of reliability requirements before crafting dissimilar systems to interoperate. Obviously, this the software architecture and developing the software interoperation provides a significant advantage, but comes applications. Highly reliable systems often require with a cost in the form of maintainability, resources and redundant capability, and this holds true for software system complexity. As software interfaces with other components as well. In addition, software problems tend components and actually performs the interface function, to propagate, resulting in a degradation of system reliability controlling it and ensuring the interfaces provide the over time. For example, a Malaysian Airlines Boeing 777 desired OA capability becomes a major software-suffered several flight control problems resulting in: a near management and software-discipline challenge.
stall situation, contradicting instrument indications, false warnings, and difficulty controlling the aircraft in both performed, neither of which is acceptable in combat autopilot and manual flight modes. The problem was operations. traced to software in an air data inertial reference unit that was feeding erroneous data to the aircraft's primary flight 9 Security computer (PFC), which is used in both autopilot and manual flight modes. The PFC continued to try to correct With software performing so many critical functions, for the erroneous data received, adjusting flight control there is little doubt that software applications are a prime surfaces in all modes of flight, displaying indications that target for anyone opposing US and Allied forces. Critical the aircraft was approaching stall speed and overspeed weapon system and networking software must be resistant limits simultaneously, and causing wind shear alarms to to hacking, spoofing, mimicking, and all other manner of sound close to landing [4] . It is critical for system attack. There must be capabilities of isolating attacks and reliability that the software developers understand how portions of networks that have been compromised without outputs from software applications are used by interfaced losing the ability to continue operations in critical combat systems so that appropriate reliability safeguards can be situations. The software developer must know all these engineered into the developed software.
capabilities are essential before he/she constructs software architectures and software programs, as this knowledge
Software that freezes or shuts down the system when will profoundly influence the software design and an anomaly occurs is certainly not reliable nor acceptable application development. for critical weapon systems; yet, these characteristics are prevalent in commercially based software systems.
Interoperability challenges are increased when the Mission reliability is a function of the aggregation of the system-of-systems have the type of security requirements system's subcomponent reliability, so every software needed by the DoD. Legacy systems and existing security subcomponent is contributing to or detracting from that protocols will likely need to be considered before other reliability.
The complexity of software makes security architecture can be effectively designed. OA understanding all failure modes nearly impossible, but capabilities will be hampered by the critical need for there are many techniques that software developers can security; both must be carefully balanced to optimize employ when designing the architecture and engineering system performance and security. This balance of OA and the applications to improve the software component security must be managed by the DoD and not the software reliability. Once requirements are clearly communicated to developer. the developers, the software can be engineered with redundancy or "safe mode" capabilities to vastly improve Physical security schemes and operating procedures mission reliability when anomalies occur. The key is will also have an impact on the software architecture. identifying the reliability requirements and making them Residual software on equipment or munitions that could clear to the software developers.
fall into enemy hands presents another type of security challenge that needs to be addressed during the application 8 Safety development. For example, the ATACMS missile airdelivers some of its warheads, leaving the missile body to Very few software applications have the required freefall to the surface. It is very conceivable that the body safety margins associated with critical weapon systems could be intact and, of course, unsecured. If critical used by warfighters in combat situations in which they mission software was still within the body and found by are depending on these margins for their survival. enemy forces, valuable information may be gleaned from Typically, the software developers have only a vague idea the casing, such as how the system finds its targets. We of what their software is doing and how critical that would certainly want the developer to design the function is to the warfighter employing the weapon system. applications in a way that would make anything recovered Safety performance must be communicated to the software useless to the enemy, but this is a capability that is not developers from the beginning of development so they intuitive to most software developers. understand the link between software functionality and systems safety.
10 Network Development
Software safety is clearly linked with reliability, as
The network is a lynchpin for the combat software that is more reliable is inherently safer. It is effectiveness of NCW architecture, and as such, should be critical that the software developer understands how the developed under a professional Program Management warfighter expects the software to operate in abnormal (PM) organization. The US Navy has achieved optimal situations, degraded modes, and when inputs are outside of results by assigning a PM for the Link 16 Program as noted expected values. Much commercially based software by SEI: "The Navy created a PMO and funded it with simply ceases to function under these conditions or gives money from affected programs. These monies were error messages that supercede whatever function was being returned to programs specifically to work toward Link 16 capability" [3] . SEI goes on to describe the need for References professional program management by stating, "What is needed are processes that help to reach agreements, [ 
